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IF IT'S A DUCK AND DANGEROUS-

PERMANENTLY CLIP ITS WINGS OR
TREAT IT TILL IT CAN FLY?: A
THERAPEUTIC PERSPECTIVE ON
DIFFICULT DECISIONS, SHORT-SIGHTED

SOLUTIONS AND VIOLENT SEXUAL
PREDATORS AFIrER KANSAS v.
HENDRICKS
Keri K. Gould*
I. INTRODUCTION

You remember the old joke1 where the yuppie couple walks into
*apoultry butcher with a bird under one of their arms. "Help us, help
us," they say, "how can we tell if this is a duck?" "Well," says the
butcher, "first you look at it and see if it looks like a duck. Next listen to it and hear if it quacks like a duck. Then you should give it a
little push to see if it walks like a duck. Finally," says the butcher,
pausing dramatically, "take a whiff of the load it leaves as it walks
away.., if it looks, quacks, and walks like a duck, and then it dumps
like a duck... THEN YOU KNOW IT'S A DUCK!"
In a perhaps perverse way, this anecdote can be seen as a parable formulating a useful pedagogic methodology to examine the
three opinions comprising the Supreme Court's decision in Kansas v.
* Fordham University School of Law; B.S., Union College, Schenectady,
N.Y.; J.D., The Washington College of Law, The American University, Washing-

ton, D.C. I would like to thank Fordham University School of Law for the summer research grant which, in part, funded the writing of this Article as well as
Christina Fischer and Darice Guzman for their research assistance, and especially Milon Dey-Chao who, once again, came to my rescue with her untiring research, and hard work.

1. Even though I am from Long Island, New York-home to Long Island
Ducklings and the Big Duck-go on, look it up in the Historic Register-I'm
sure this joke, told in a slightly more off-color and graphic manner, and perhaps
with some regional differences, has had national exposure.
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Hendricks2 and some potential effects that the decision may have on
others confined by the mental health system. To be effective as a
teaching methodology, the narrative outline of the parable should, at
first glance, be familiar, such that the reader can identify with the
characters and the situations illuminated in the parable.3 There must
be an indeterminacy to the meaning of the parable so that the reader
can struggle toward its meaning and relevance to his or her own life.4
The goal of such a teaching strategy is to transform the reader's unfocused discomfort with not quite "getting it" into the reader's acknowledgment of the source of his or her frustration.' Once acknowledged, the hope is that the reader will then be able to journey
onward to a fuller understanding of the conundrum posed and the
answer to be determined.6
Professor Robert A. Burt, a constitutional scholar, suggests that
parable methodology is a useful means of teaching some areas of
constitutional law, specifically those cases which challenge racial segregation or the institutional treatment of retarded persons.7 He explains that courts intrinsically utilize parable methodology in their
opinions.8 In comparing secular judicial conduct to the theological
embrace of parable-teaching methodology, Professor Burt states,
"[jiudicial invocation of the Constitution recurrently uses the same
methods as these parables: converting all into needy outsiders by

2. 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
3. See generally Robert A. Burt, ConstitutionalLaw and the Teaching of the
Parables,93 YALE L.J. 455, 467-71 (1984) ("[T]he purpose [of the parable] is to
confound insiders and outsiders, to unsettle those who are confident of their rectitude .... [T]he strategy is to heighten the listeners' sense of their own vulnerability.").
4. See id. at 469. When a contemporary moral or ethical question "is moved
to a different time or place, it is possible to escape those cultural blinders and
and least to get to the relevant issues presented." The parable should be presented "in a way that hopefully holds the reader's attention until the whole package can be considered." NORVAL MORRIS, THE BROTHEL BOY AND OTHER
PARABLES OF THE LAW vii (1992).
5. See Burt, supranote 3, at 469.

6. See id. A parable will lead readers to acknowledge a question, not an answer. Once the proper question is taught, listeners will teach themselves the
proper answer. See id.
This methodology is in keeping with recent theories of adult learning.
See, e.g., MARK TENNANT, PSYCHOLOGY AND ADULT LEARNING (2d ed. 1997).
7. See Burt, supranote 3, at 457.

& See id. at 472. Professor Burt notes that parable methodology is available
to courts because of their institutional qualities, including the special posture of
judges as remote protectors of the Constitution, a document which commands
almost divine sanctification within our legal system. See id, at 466-67.
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confounding insider and outsider and then offering hope for ultimate
protection by mapping a path back inside for everyone." 9
Professor Norval Morris, an expert on crime and punishment,
has written a collection of parables to illustrate criminal law debates
on legal and ethical issues including the death penalty, the insanity
defense, and child neglect. He calls these parables secular, agnostic
parables which pose problems but are uncertain in their solution.'
This Article suggests that parable methodology is a useful backdrop
for analyzing another area of constitutional law as well, the violent
sexual predator statutes which have proliferated over the last ten
years. Specifically, the article will refer to the "duck" parable in examining the content of the three written opinions contained in the
Hendricks decision. In addition, the Article will address some of the
potential therapeutic and non-therapeutic effects of the decision on
the roles of individuals within the mental health and criminal justice
legal systems.
Returning to the duck parable, the reader may be discomforted
when reading about duck excrement in this Article's introduction.
The reader may also be bewildered as to the relevance between such
a topic and a Supreme Court decision regarding violent sexual predators. Parable teaching methodology hopes, however, to transform
this discomfort and bewilderment into a thoughtful discussion of how
the judicial authors of the three opinions in Hendricks define the legal relationship between two of the state's methods of confininement-the criminal justice system and the mental health system-and
what to call a new statutory construction which incorporates elements
of both systems.
The underlying lesson of a parable appears to be finding the presumptive element, the addition of which will authoritatively end the
controversy. The duck parable ends with the butcher's presumptive
element: the load left, which in the butcher's mind, conclusively determines that the bird is indeed a duck. A law professor has the freedom to pursue parable inquiry throughout the semester or within the
page limitations of an article. But in the case of a Supreme Court
decision, the dialogic process ends, at least for the immediate future,
when one side secures numerical dominance by virtue of judicial
votes, over the other. When, as in the Hendricks case, when multiple
opinions are filed, then the ambiguities which remain unanswered are
9. Id. at 471.
10. See generally MORRIs, supranote 4.
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likely to resurface in other cases.
In Hendricks, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, with Justice
Thomas writing for the majority, reversed the decision of the Kansas
Supreme Court and upheld the constitutionality of the Kansas
Sexually Violent Predator Act n (the Act). The Act "establishes procedures for the civil commitment of persons who, due to 'mental abnormality' or 'personality disorder' are likely to engage in 'predatory
acts of sexual violence.' ' 12 The majority held that the Act's use of the
term "mental abnormality" instead of "mental illness" or "mental
disease" was legally sufficient to qualify a person for a particularized
form of civil commitment. 3 Additionally, the court found that the
Kansas scheme satisfied substantive due process, and that the Act
was clearly civil in nature.14 This resulted in a finding that commitment pursuant to the Act was not punitive, thereby precluding any
double jeopardy or ex post facto violation. 5
The existence of an ex post facto violation was one of the most
virulently fought issue in Hendricks. This argument goes to the very
heart of the elements which distinguish criminal punishment from
civil commitment. The majority found that sexually violent predator
(SVP) status and subsequent commitment was not construed as punishment, thereby dissipating any claim to an ex post facto violation.17
Justice Breyer, in his dissent, construed the state's refusal or inability
to provide treatment to Mr. Hendricks, a person whom the state had
earlier classified as treatable, as antitherapeutic and punitive in nature and effect. 8 Directly contradicting the majority, Justice Breyer
found that the statutory scheme was punitive and the commitment
pursuant to the statute violated the Constitution's Ex Post Facto
Clause. 9

11. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2086.
12. Id. at 2076 (citation omitted).
13. See id. at 2080.
14. See id. at 2079-85.
15. See id. at 2085-86.
16. The Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause prevents the government from
punishing that which is not-or was not at the time-criminal or punishable, or
from subsequently enhancing the agreed-upon punishment. See U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 9, cl. 3. Hendricks claimed that his civil commitment as a sexually violent
predator (SVP) additionally punished him for past conduct, namely the crimes
for which he had previously been convicted and served time. See Hendricks, 117
S. Ct. at 2081.
17. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2086.
18. See id. at 2097-98 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
19. See id. at 2098 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Surprisingly to most mental health law practitioners and scholars, 0 neither side, except perhaps Justice Ginsberg who declined to
join Part I of the dissent, took issue with the use of the term "mental
abnormality" or "personality disorder," as distinguished from
"mental illness" or "disease," as a predicate for civil commitment.2
The majority, comprised of Justices Thomas, Rehnquist,
O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy-Kennedy who also submitted his
own concurrence-put forth what can be viewed as an alarmingly expantionist, sanist," and pretextual7 analysis of the facts and relevant
2

20. See, e.g., Fred Cohen, Supreme Court Finds Sexually Violent Predator
Law Constitutional, 1 SEXUAL AssAULT REPORT 7 (Sept./Oct. 1997); Eric S.
Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence: Setting Principled Boundaries on Sex Offender Commitments, 72 IND. L.J. 157, 158 (1996) (citation omitted) ("Dating

back some twenty years, the Court's civil commitment decisions now point
squarely to 'mental disorder' as the pivotal concept in ascertaining the outer
bounds of the state's power to use civil commitment.").
21. This is particularly surprising in light of the Supreme Court's relatively
recent mental health law case, where it held that the Constitution mandates a
finding of mental illness or mental disease and dangerousness to support civil
commitment. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992). In particular,
Foucha held that dangerousness, without mental illness, even if combined with
an anti-social personality disorder, could not form the predicate for civil commitment. See id.

22. Sanism is "an irrational prejudice ...of the same quality and character of
other prevailing prejudices such as racism, sexism, heterosexism and ethnic bigotry that have been reflected both in our legal system and in the way that lawyers
represent clients .... [Sanism] similarly infects both our jursiprudence and our

lawyering practices ....It is largely socially acceptable and largely unacknowledged." Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism" 46 SMU L. REv. 373, 374 (1992); see
also ichael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Sanism, Social Science, and the
Development of Mental DisabilityLaw Jurisprudence,11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 47, 49

(1993).
23. "'Pretextuality' is the way in which courts often accept (either implicitly
or explicitly) testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest (frequently
meretricious) decision making, specifically where witnesses, especially expert
witnesses, show a high propensity to distort purposely their testimonial ends."
Michael L. Perlin, "Make Promises by the Hour": Sex, Drugs, the ADA, and

PsychiatricHospitalization,46 DEPAUL L. REv. 947, 956 (1997) (citation omitted) [hereinafter Perlin, Promises]. The testimony of forensic experts and the
decisions of legislators and fact-finders reflect the pretexts of the forensic mental
health system. See Michael L. Perlin & Keri K. Gould, Johnny's in the Base-

ment/Mixing Up His Medicine: Therapeutic Jurisprudenceand Clinical Teaching
3 (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) [hereinafter Perlin & Gould,
Johnny's]; see also Deborah A. Dorfman, Through a Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Filter:Fear and Pretextuality in Mental Disability Law, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM.
RTS. 805, 812-19 (1993) (discussing how pretextuality is played out in the legal
context); Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality,Psychiatry and Law: Of
"Ordinary Common Sense," Heuristic Reasoning and Cognitive Dissonance, 19
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 131 (1991) (examining the relationship be-
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law. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsberg-Parts II and III only-grounded his dissent in a way which es-

poused the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence by promoting the

evaluation of a therapeutic outcome. 4
This Article analyzes the Hendricks decision by parable and
through the lens of therapeutic jurisprudence." Having already exposed the reader to a brief overview of teaching by parable, the discussion turns to therapeutic jurisprudence and the Hendricks decision. Lastly, the Article highlights some potential therapeutic and
non-therapeutic effects of the Hendricks decision. Specifically, it focuses on the possible effects that this decision may have on the lives
of people who are viewed as having a mental abnormality, particularly in the area of the right to sexual expression for institutionalized
persons, the potential benefits and negative consequences to persons
committed to the sexual predator units, and how this new construct
may impact prosecutorial decision making and lawyering.
II. THERAPEUTIC JURSIPRUDENCE

Therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) is the "study of the role of the
law as a therapeutic agent. ' It is an interdisciplinary means of analyzing legal interactions, all of which may have potentially therapeutic or non-therapeutic consequences. The consequences may be explicit or they may require an interdisciplinary approach to decipher.
tween the law and the mental health profession) [hereinafter Perlin, Morality];
Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency,
47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 625, 627 (1993) (asserting that the "relationship between
the legal process and mentally disabled litigants is often pretextual") [hereinafter
Perlin, Pretexts].
24. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2097-98 (Breyer, J. dissenting).

25. For a therapeutic jurisprudence analysis of the case law that established
the civil rights of involuntary civilly committed persons, see Michael L. Perlin et
al., Therapeutic Jurisprudenceand the Civil Rights of InstitutionalizedMentally
Disabled Persons: Hopeless Oxymoron or Path to Redemption?, 1 PSYCHOL.,
PUB. POL'Y, & L. 80 (1995).

26. David B. Wexler, Some Thoughts and Observations on the Teaching of
TherapeuticJurisprudence,35 REViSTA DE DERECHO PUERTORRIQUENO 273,

274 (1996) [hereinafter Wexler, Some Thoughts]; see generally ESSAYS IN
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1991)
(describing the theory and potential practical applications of therapeutic jurisprudence); LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY; DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996) [hereinafter
DEVELOPMENTS] (discussing the role of therapeutic jurisprudence in various
fields of law); THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE:

THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC

AGENT (David B. Wexler ed., 1990) [hereinafter THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE] (a collection of essays arguing that the law should be more sensitive to
mental health discipline).
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However, therapeutic jurisprudence encourages "the exploration of
ways in which, consistent with principles of justice, the knowledge,
theories, and insights of the mental health and related disciplines can
help shape the development of the law."27 The challenge of therapeutic jurisprudence is to reach "beyond the boundaries of law professors and academic mental health professionals" to "include the
perspectives of practitioners and consumers," and to blur the lines
between theory and practice to set the stage for law reform.2
Although therapeutic jurisprudence seeks to identify therapeutic
consequences, it by no means suggests that therapeutic considerations should trump other factors in evaluating a legal practice or outcome.29 "Most often, [therapeutic jurisprudence] proposes rules, pro-

27. Wexler, Some Thoughts, supra note 26, at 274.

28. Michael L. Perlin, Transcript of Remarks at Loyola Law School Mental
Disability Colloquium (Nov. 15, 1997) (transcript on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).

Therapeutic Jurisprudence has captured the attention of prominent forensic experts, academic psychologists, psychiatrists, and practitioners. See, e.g.,
Special Section, 64 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 172 (1994); Special Theme:
TherapeuticJurisprudence,1 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 3 (1995); Symposium,
What Is Therapeutic Jurisprudence?,10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTs. 623 (1993);
Symposium, 20 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & Civ. CONFiNEMENT 243 (1994).

For literature discussing the therapeutic consequences of attorney roles,
see Janet B. Abisch, MediationalLawyering in the Civil Commitment Context A
Therapeutic JurisprudenceSolution to the Counsel Role Dilemma, 1 PSYCHOL.,

PuB. PoL'Y, & L. 120 (1995) (discussing mediational lawyering in the civil com-

mitment context); Jan C. Costello, "Why Would I Need a Lawyer?" Legal Counsel and Advocacy for People with Mental Disabilities,in LAW, MENTAL HEALTH,
AND MENTAL DISORDER 15 (Bruce D. Sales & Daniel W. Shuman eds., 1995)

(establishing how counsel's role is perceived by various participants in the sys-

tem); Keri K. Gould, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Competency
Evaluation Requests: The Defense Attorney's Dilemma, 18 INT'L. J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 83 (1995); Keri K. Gould, Turning Rat and Doing Time for Uncharged, Dismissed, or Acquitted Crimes: Do the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Promote Respect for the Law?, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTs. 835 (1993)

[hereinafter Gould, Turning Rat]; Perlin & Gould, Johnny's, supra note 23, at 9
(discussing the influences of therapeutic jurisprudence on clinical legal educa-

tion); Robert F. Schopp, TherapeuticJurisprudenceand Conflicts Among Values
in Mental Health Law, 11 BEHAV. SC. & L. 31 (1993) (endorsing a priority for

the deontic aspect of autonomy over well-being but allowing a balancing of the
consequentialist component of autonomy against well-being).
29. See Perlin & Gould, Johnny's, supra note 23, at 9; David B. Wexler, New
Directions in Therapeutic Jurisprudence:Breaking the Bounds of Conventional
Mental Health Law Scholarship, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTs. 759, 761 (1993);
Wexler, Some Thoughts, supra note 26, at 274-75.

Other factors may include individual autonomy, integrity of the factfinding process, community safety, and issues of efficiency and economy. See
Wexler, Some Thoughts, supranote 26, at 275.
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cedures, and roles intended to promote therapeutic effects or limit
contratherapeutic effects for those directly involved."" Therapeutic
jurisprudence includes interdisciplinary research to support informed
legal decision making. In doing so, therapeutic jurisprudence may be
seen as "a conceptual framework" seeking novel ways to maximize
the areas of agreement between co-existing but traditionally noncollaborative systems.
Over the last seven years, since Professors David Wexler and
Bruce Winick first introduced therapeutic jurisprudence, this method
for examining mental health law has developed into a therapeutic
approach to the law as a whole. 1 Therapeutic jurisprudence allows us
to examine the dynamics of the law's impact on emotional life32 from
a variety of vantage points, including the judiciary.3 Scholars recently have examined other constitutional cases in the area of mental
disability law-O'Connor v. Donaldson,s4 Wyatt v. Stickney,35 and
Lessard v. Schmidt 6-- to determine whether the legacies of the

placement of constitutional limitations on the civil commitment
process have been therapeuticY This Article continues to utilize
therapeutic jurisprudence and parable methodology to examine the
Hendricks decision and its potential effects on the intersection of
criminal and civil confinement schemes.

30. Robert F. Schopp, Sexual Predatorsand the Structure of the Mental Health
System: Expanding the Normative Focus of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 1
PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y. & L. 161, 162 (1995) (footnote omitted).
31. See generally BRUCE J. WINICK, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED: ESSAYS ON MENTAL HEALTH LAw (1997) (compiling a series of essays
applying therapeutic jurisprudence to mental health law).

32 See Christopher Slobogin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to

Ponder, 1 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 193, 193-94 (1995); Dennis P. Stolle &

David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudenceand Preventive Law: A Combined
Concentration to Invigorate the Everyday Practice of Law, 39 ARiz. L. REv. 25,
25 (1997).
33. See Judge Robert J. Kane, A Sentencing Model for the 21st Century, FED.

PROBATION, Sept. 1995, at 10.
34. 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (discussing the constitutional right to liberty).
35. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971),
344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd in
part, rev'd in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974)
(discussing the constitutional right to liberty).
36. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remandedper curiam, 414

U.S. 473 (1974), on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and remanded, 421 U.S. 957-58 (1975), reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976)
(applying both substantive and procedural due process at an involuntary civil
commitment hearing).
37. See Perlin, supra note 25, at 80.
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Ill. FACrS OF KANSAS V. HENDRICKS

Leroy Hendricks has a long and sordid history of sexually abusing children." His last conviction, by plea bargain, convicted him of
taking "indecent liberties"-attempting to fondle-two thirteenyear-old boys.3 ' The sentence was bargained down to five to twenty
years, and the State agreed to drop one count and "refrained from
' 4
requesting imposition of the Habitual Criminal Act." Hendricks
was scheduled for release to a half-way house when the Kansas
Sexually Violent Predator Act was enacted and put into effect. Hen41
dricks was the first person to whom the Act was applied.
Pursuant to the Act, the District Attorney42 filed a petition in district court seeking to civilly commit Mr. Hendricks involuntarily under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act43 upon his release from
prison. At the probable cause determination hearing, Hendricks
moved to dismiss the petition based upon insufficient factual allegations, failure to serve Hendricks with the petition, unconstitutionality
of the Act, and breach of the plea agreement44 The court found that
there was probable cause to believe that Hendricks was a sexually
violent predator as defined by the Act and that he should be evalu-

38. The petition filed by the District Attorney stated the following additional
criminal history of prior sexual offenses from jurisdictions other than Kansas: a
1960 conviction for Indecent Liberties with a Child in Spokane, Washington and
1963 and 1967 convictions for Indecent Liberties with a Child in Seattle, Washington. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 130 (Kan. 1996). In addition, at Mr.
Hendricks's commitment trial, both of his stepchildren testified to repeated,

long-term sexual abuse by Mr. Hendricks. See id. at 143. (Larson, J., dissenting).
39. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. 2072,2078 (1997).
40. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 130.
41. See Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2085; see also Cohen, supranote 20, at 7; Nola
Foulston & Carla J. Stovall, Supreme Court to Consider Kansas Law Keeping
PredatorsConfined, 31 THE PROSECUTOR, Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 26.

42. The statute was later amended to have the Attorney General file the ini-

tial petition. See KAN. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59-29a04 (West 1994 & Supp. 1996).

43. See Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 130. The Kansas Act was modeled after a
similar statutory scheme enacted in Washington in 1990. See id. at 131. Similar
sex offender involuntary civil commitment statutes at that time had been adopted
in Wisconsin, Minnesota, California, and Arizona. See Wis. STAT. ANN. §§
980.01-.13 (West Supp. 1997)); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02 (West Supp. 1997));
1995 Cal. Stat. 762-63 (codified as amended at CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§

6600-08 (West Supp. 1998)); 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws 257 (codified as amended at
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. 88 13-4601 to 4609 (West Supp. 1997)); see also Amicus
Brief, American Civil Liberties Union, Kansas v. Hendricks. Since that time and
especially since the Hendricks decision, more states have passed similar legislation.
44. See Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 130.
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ated at the State Hospital. 45 The court reserved ruling on the constitutionality of the statute and whether the plea agreement estopped
the State.46 Hendricks, on advice of counsel, initially refused to participate in the psychiatric evaluation at the state hospital. The district
court then ordered him to comply with the exam, ruling that the Act
was civil in nature and that Mr. Hendricks had no right against selfincrimination.47 Hendricks then requested a jury trial to determine
"beyond a reasonable doubt" whether he fulfilled the elements of a
sexually violent predator, as defined by the Kansas Act.4 After
hearing testimony from Mr. Hendricks, Charles Beford, the chief
psychologist at Lamed State Hospital, and William Logan, a forensic
psychiatrist who testified on behalf of Hendricks, the jury found
Hendricks to be a sexually violent predator.49 He was transferred and
involuntarily confined to the Lamed State Hospital.0 The court,
however, reserved ruling on the constitutional claim.51 Hendricks appealed.
On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court invalidated the Act, statthat
a precommitment condition of mental abnormality did not
ing
satisfy substantive due process requirements that civil Commitment
must be predicated on a finding of mental illness. 2 The majority did
not address the ex post facto or double jeopardy claims. The state
appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Hendricks filed a
cross-petition reasserting the federal double jeopardy and ex post
facto claims.
IV. JUSTICE THOMAS AND THE MAJORITY OPINION

Just as the butcher in the duck parable found the presumptive
element with which to categorize the bird as a duck, the Justices in
the Supreme Court made choices upon which elements of the Kansas
Sexually Violent Predator Act they could presumptively rely on to
determine whether it was civil or punitive in nature. In order to define the relationship between the mental health system, driven by in45. See id
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 130-31.
49. The jury found that Hendricks suffered from pedophilia, a mental abnormality under the Act, and that he was likely to engage in predatory sexually
violent behavior when released to the community. See id.
50. See id. at 131.
51. See id. at 130.
52. See id at 138.
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capacitation, and the criminal system, driven by incarceration and
retribution, the Justices had to weigh "whether the 'great safeguards'
of the Constitution dictate a principled stopping place for the drive
toward prevention. ' The violent sexual predator cases are difficult,
since they push even the most liberal policymakers and commentators to set the outer boundaries of constitutional protections for some
of the most reviled members of society.m Justice Thomas, writing for
the majority, found that the hybrid Act acceptably combined the two
systems while retaining their essential distinguishing elements.5 Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, was willing to agree with the majority for the moment but warned that if the line blurred between the
two systems in the future, then the statute would violate the Constitution.56 Justice Breyer, using a therapeutic jurisprudence analysis of
the statute, found that the lines had blurred between the essential
constructs that legally support criminal incarceration or civil incapacitation.' To begin with, there is no suggestion that persons subject to SVP status are not responsible by the time they become subject to the allegedly civil commitment." Nonetheless, it is important
to examine the locus from which the legality of control over a person's liberty, probably for that person's lifetime, is found. 9
The majority opinion was, unsurprisingly, a "sanist" opinion
53. Janus, supra note 20, at 157.

54. As one commentator has noted:
Tjhe fact that sexually violent predators-particularly those like Henncks who preyed on children-are being incarcerated twice for the
same offense based on a questionable prediction that they are likely to
repeat this type of sexual violence is not going to engender much sympathy from most people. There is little doubt that the public would like to
see such people incapacitated permanently.
John W. Parry, Executive Summary and Analysis, 21 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DisABmLrrY L. RP. 435,435 (1997).
55. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 2081-85 (1997). The civil and
criminal justifications for involuntary confinement assume different purposes
with "attendant stigmas, procedures, and conditions of confinement." Stephen J.
Morse, Blame and Danger:An Essay on Preventive Detention, 76 B.U. L. RV.
113, 121 (1996). "A punitive purpose is a necessary condition for criminal confinement, whereas civil incapacitation does not aim to punish." Id. The Eighth
Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment establishes the limits
of the conditions for criminal confinement, while civil confinement should seek
to limit intrusion to only that necessary to meet the state's reason to detain. See
id. at 121-22.
56. See Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
57. See id. at 2088 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
58. See Morse, supra note 55, at 135 ("Nonresponsibility is usually a neces-

sary condition of justifiable involuntary civil commitment .....
59. See Janus, supranote 20, at 191.
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which uses a pretextual agenda to reinstate the Kansas Violent Sexual Predator Act. Clearly diminishing the tide of prior precedent,"
Justice Thomas held that constitutional minimums were met under
the following conditions: the state provided no treatment during the
purportedly civil commitment; the state found that meaningful
treatment was impossible; or the state provided something significantly less than full treatment, because treatment had been statutorily relegated to a concern ancillary to confinement.6 Indeed, the
majority found that the entire statutory scheme of the Kansas Sexual
Predator Act was merely a benign method for restraining undesirable
and potentially dangerous behavior.62
Justice Thomas has persistently engaged in anti-therapeutic decision making in each of the seven mental disability cases decided
since he first joined the Supreme Court. Justice Thomas has consistently sided with whichever position most narrowly construes the
rights of persons with mental disabilities, the position which promotes the continued institutionalization, incarceration, or segregation
of such persons, or the position which tends to deny any less restrictive alternatives. 63 In doing so, he has resorted to outdated research
60. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574-76 (1975) (holding that a
state may not constitutionally confine an individual once treatment has ended);
see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) (holding that a state is
obligated to provide reasonable treatment and that it may be unreasonable not to
provide treatment where it reduces the need for confinement).
61. Justice Thomas wrote:
[T]he Kansas court's determination that the Act's 'overriding concern'
was the continued 'segregation of sexually violent offenders is consistent with our conclusion that the Act establishes civil proceedings,....
especially when.. .coupled with the State's ancillary goal of providing
[W e have never
treatment to those offenders, if such is possible ....
held that the Constitution prevents a State from civilly detaining those
for whom no treatment is available, but who nevertheless pose a danger
to others.
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2084 (citation omitted).
62. See id. at 2085-86.
63. The seven mental disability cases in which Justice Thomas has taken part
include the following: Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2076-86 (authoring the majority opinion upholding the Kansas Sexual Predator Act); Shannon v. United
States, 512 U.S. 573, 575-88 (1994) (authoring the majority opinion, which held
that the Insanity Defense Reform Act did not require a jury instruction regarding the consequences of a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict); Simmons v.
South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 178-85 (1994) (joining the dissent regarding the
consequences of not instructing the jury as to whether life imprisonment carried
with it the possibility of parole); Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 391-402 (1993)
(authoring the majority opinion, which held that the standard for competency to
plead guilty or waive the right to counsel was the same standard as competency
to stand trial); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 314-34 (1993) (joining the majority
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and empirical studies, frequently reaching back over a century and
inaccurately stating or taking out of context findings which support
his position. This, unfortunately, recurs in his jurisprudence, as one
commentator noted regarding a past mental health law case:
Thomas's opinion [in Foucha] is astounding for several reasons. First, he relies on legal scholarship that precedes (by
10-40 years) the Court's application of the due process
clause to cases involving the institutionalization of mentally
disabled criminal defendants. Second, he relies on a mid1950's characterization of psychiatric precision in diagnosis
Third, Justice Thomas's twin foci on the sanist judges' worst
fears about insanity acquittees-that they "faked" the insanity defense in the first place and that the improper use of the
defense will allow for the speedy release of serial killers-is
a profound demonstration of how sanist judges distort social
science evidence."
Even other Justices have noted his disingenuous work.65 In Henregarding
involuntary commitment of mentally retarded persons); Rigopinion
gins
v. Nevada,
504 U.S. 127, 146-57 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (dissenting
from the majority, which held that the defendant could not be forcibly drugged
for the trial without considering less restrictive alternatives, including deciding
whether the drugs are medically appropriate and essential for the defendant's
safety or the safety of others); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (dissenting from the majority, which held that a dangerous but not
mentally ill acquittee could not be involuntarily held in a psychiatric center).
64. Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 22, at 61.
65. For example, Justice White in Fouchav. Louisiananoted that
Justice Thomas in dissent complains that Foucha should not be released
based on psychiatric opinion that he is not mentally ill because such
opinion is not sufficiently precise... [but] more to the point, medical
predictions of dangerousness seem to be reliable enough for Justice
Thomas to permit the State to continue to hold Foucha in a mental institution, even where the psychiatrist would say no more than that he
would hesitate to certify that Foucha would not be dangerous to himself
or others.
Foucha, 504 U.S. at 76 n.3.
Later, Justice White reiterated that Justice Thomas's reliance on the
Model Penal Code was "misplaced" and that Thomas "fail[ed] to mention" that a
"current" provision had not been amended since 1962 and that related explanatory notes "expressly concede that related... provisions... are unconstitutional" and finally, that Thomas's quotation from the Commentary was
"importantly incomplete." Id. at 83-84 n.6.
In the same case Justice O'Connor noted the inaccuracy of Justice Thomas's research, saying that, "Justice Thomas claims that 11 states have laws comparable to Louisiana's... but even this number overstates the case." Id. at 89.
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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dricks Justice Thomas found the entire scheme to be entirely benign-treatment need not be mandated, mental illness need not be
found, and that the legislature calls the statute civil is dispositive
without any serious inquiry.' Justice Thomas held that since the legislature's intent was to write a civil commitment statute, the court can
only reject that legislative intent when there is "'the clearest proof'
that 'the statutory scheme' [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect
as to negate [the State's] intention to make it 'civil.""'6 The Kansas
Act, he found, there was no punitive intent, and deterrence was not a
function of the statute.' The stated purpose of the claimed civil
commitment was to hold the defendant until his mental abnormality
no longer caused him to be a threat to others. The Act's overriding
concern is the segregation of sexually violent offenders consistent
with civil proceedings." Thomas said that committees under the Act
are afforded the same status as others who have been civilly committed.70 The majority opinion is indifferent to seeking a therapeutic
outcome. Justice Thomas is unconcerned with treatment issues, content to have SVP committees treated in a manner very similar to
prisoners and he constrains the constitutional rights afforded involuntary civil committees under recent Supreme Court cases.

V. THE KENNEDY CONCURRENCE
If Justice Kennedy were the butcher in our parable, we would be
left not knowing if the bird was a duck, or, to mix in another fable, an
ugly duckling which might turn out to be a swan. The Kennedy concurrence may turn out to be the most important, and certainly the
most far-sighted portion of the Hendricks decision. Kennedy's concurrence was, at best, a tentative alliance with the majority in its application of the Act to Hendricks at the time. Beyond this, however,
Kennedy took a hard look at the future and cautioned against the
practice of using "a civil confinement law.., in conjunction with the
criminal process, whether or not the law is given retroactive application."" Kennedy went right to the heart of the interstitial debate,
stating that Kansas could not take what might have been an appro-

66.
67.
6&
69.
70.
71.

See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2081-85.
ld. (citing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)).
See id. at 2082.
See id. at 2083.
See id.
Id. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

ApFril 1998]

THE EFFECTSOF KANSAS V. HENDRICKS

.873

priate criminal sentence-life-and call it a civil commitment.' His
rationale was that if the "purpose of the Kansas law had been to
provide treatment but the treatment provisions were adopted as a
sham or mere pretext, there would have been an indication of the
forbidden purpose to punish. 7 3 Kennedy continued that confinement of persons "who, by reason of mental disease or mental abnormality, constitute a real, continuing, and serious danger to society ...
[may be] permitted ...
punish." 74

provided there is no object or purpose to

Unlike Thomas, who was unconcerned with psychiatric diagnosis
as long as someone called it a mental abnormality, Kennedy seemed
relieved that Hendricks had been diagnosed as having pedophilia
' This, Kennedy felt,
which was "at least described in the DSM-IV."75
6
somehow seemed to give it medical validity.
Kennedy brought up an important point missed by the majority.
The state cannot use civil commitment as a safety net for sweeping up
the mistakes made by prosecutors] 7 In Hendricks the state agreed to
a plea bargain. In the plea bargain the state gave up the right to incarcerate Mr. Hendricks for more than twenty years, gave up the
right to classify him as a habitual criminal, and dismissed a third
count of indecent libertiess We do not know why the state supported, or perhaps even offered, the plea agreement. It is unclear
whether the prosecutor was inexperienced, made a mistake, or if the
decision was based upon a lack of evidence which would have become obvious at trial. The decision may have been premised upon a
concern for the young victims. In any case, the State must stand by
the bargains entered into and cannot expect the civil commitment
process to substitute for the sentences lost. As Kennedy stated,
the concern instead is whether it is the criminal system or
the civil system which should make the decision in the first
place. If the civil system is used simply to impose punishment after the State makes an improvident plea bargain on
the criminal side, then it is not performing its proper function [because] ...while incapacitation is a goal common to

72 See icL (Kennedy, J., concurring).
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
ing).

Id (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
Id.(Kennedy J., concurring).
See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 155 (Kan. 1996) (Larson, J., dissent-
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both the criminal and civil systems of confinement, retribution and general deterrence are reserved for the criminal
system alone.79
Kennedy narrowly construed the Hendricks decision. His concurrence may be seen as an invitation for future litigation if "civil
confinement were to become a mechanism for retribution or general
deterrence, or if it were shown that mental abnormality is too imprecise a category to offer a solid basis for concluding that civil detention
[because] our precedents would not suffice to validate
is justified,
it."8
VI. JUSTICE BREYER'S DISSENT
In his dissent Justice Breyer used a classic therapeutic jurisprudence analysis of the Kansas Violent Sexual Predator Act. First, he
opined that Kansas could classify Hendricks as a person subject to either its initial civil commitment law in effect or under the new Violent Sexual Predator Act.81 In doing so Justice Breyer acknowledged
the professional debate over whether Hendricks's psychiatric condition could be considered a mental illness. He condoned psychiatric2
debate because it "helps to inform the law" but does not decide it.
This is precisely the use of social science data urged by David Wexler
when he states that the interdisciplinary insights of therapeutic jurisprudence should not trump other legal or civil rights concerns." In
Justice Breyer's analysis, treatment clearly determined for him
whether the Act was civil or so punitive in effect as to render it
criminal, triggering ex post facto concerns.'
Justice Breyer next pointed out that this was not a case where
the subject was untreatable; indeed, the Kansas Attorney General
said during oral argument that Hendricks could be treated." However, the SVP program did not provide Hendricks with any significant treatment.86 These two findings framed the legal question. The
due process clause forbade Hendricks's confinement unless Kansas
provided the treatment which it conceded was available.?
79. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
80. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).

81.
82.
83.
84.

See id. at 2088 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See Wexler, Some Thoughts, supranote 26, at 274-75.
See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2088-90 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

85. See id. at 2090 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

86. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
87. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Breyer then cut to the heart of his argument by saying that he
found an ex post facto violation because the Kansas statutory scheme
inflicted a greater punishment on Mr. Hendricks." Involuntary secure confinement imposes additional punishment upon individuals
previously incarcerated for a criminal offense. "[W]here so significant a restriction of an individual's basic freedoms is at issue, a State
cannot cut corners."89
Justice Breyer, citing reasoning that is much more in line with
recent Supreme Court decisions in the mental disability field. For instance, the decisions in both Riggins v. Nevada and Foucha v. Louisiana9' looked much more toward the medical appropriateness of the
proposed intervention. Breyer continued with an extensive analysis
of Allen v. Illinois which looked to the laws concerning treatment as
an important distinguishing feature. He then applied a therapeutic
jurisprudence test to determine a reasonable, therapeutic outcome:
0 where the State believes treatment exists but delays
treatment until the end of prison so that further incapacitation is necessary-it begins to look like punishment;
* where the legislature finds treatment goals incidental at
best-it begins to look like punishment;
* when, at the time of Hendricks commitment, the State
had not funded treatment, entered into treatment contracts,
or hired qualified treatment staff-it begins to look like
punishment;
0 when there is no requirement that the committing
authority consider less restrictive alternatives-it begins to
look like punishment;
* when the Kansas statute is more restrictive than all but
one other sexual predator statute-it begins to look like
punishment.94
So in looking at all considerations, is it a duck or is it punishment? To make this determination and the concomitant effect that
such a finding would have on the viability of the Act, Breyer looked
toward the potentially therapeutic basis for the policy behind the
88. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
89. Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2098 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
90. 504 U.S. 127 (1992).

91.
92.
93.
94.

504 U.S. 71 (1992).
478 U.S. 364 (1986).
See Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2091-93. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2092-95 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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legislative scheme.' Justice Breyer pointed out that a nonpunitively
motivated legislature which confines a person because of a dangerous
mental abnormality, would seek to help the individual overcome that
abnormality particularly since potentially effective treatment exists. 96
Additionally, this particular statute when compared to similar
statutes of other states, is almost alone in deferring diagnosis,
evaluation, and commitment until after the prison sentence is served
and without consideration of less restrictive alternatives.' To summarize, if it quacks it's a duck, and in this case, Breyer concluded, the
duck was punishment.
VII. POTENTIAL THERAPEUTIC AND NON-THERAPEUTIC EFFECTS
OF THE HENDRICKS DECISION

However splintered the opinions on Hendricks may be, the
Court found the Kansas statutory scheme constitutional. There were
thirty-eight states that filed amicus briefs supporting the State of
Kansas, and once the Supreme Court held for Kansas, several more
states enacted similar sexual predator statutes. This Article next
examines some of the potential therapeutic and contra-therapeutic
effects which may follow the enactment of such statutes. The Article
then discusses three groups that will be affected by this decision. The
three groups include persons subject to commitment as sexually violent predators; the lawyers who seek to commit persons pursuant to
the SVP statutes; and persons with mental disabilities who may be at
risk for administrative transfer to a SVP facility.
One possible benefit resulting from the Hendricks decision is the
greater availability of funding to develop and implement new or
more successful treatment modalities for violent sexual predators.
The availability of adequate treatment within the institution would
be a great benefit to the SVP and to the public. The structure of the
Kansas statute, however, does not seem to support this goal. First,
the Act does not even contemplate treatment until after the SVP has
served his time in prison9 As Justice Breyer illustrated in his dissent, the deferment of diagnosis, evaluation, and commitment proceedings while the criminal sentence is served and until a few weeks
prior to the individual's anticipated release cannot be considered
95.
96.
97.
98.

See id. at 2087-98 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2092 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See Cohen, supranote 20, at 14.

99. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2088 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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therapeutic for a number of reasons, including that the nexus between the forbidden behavior and any therapy is too attenuated." °
Second, the potential for increased loss of liberty while the individual is serving his criminal sentence gives the individual little incentive to abide by the institutional rules. This lack of incentive is
especially true because the continued retention is not based upon
"good behavior" while the individual is imprisoned, but rather upon
the acts which originally put him in prison, acts which the inmate is
completely powerless to change.'' People who experience unfair legal procedures have less respect for the law and legal authorities and
are less likely to accept judicial decisions. 1°' This can lead to a
"gradual erosion of obedience to the law."'0 3 Within the correctional context, this erosion would be measured by compliance or
noncompliance with institutional rules.' 4 Query if such noncompliance would not then be used to ratchet up the prosecutor's resolve and ability to induct the individual into the next type of detention, in this case a form of civil commitment.
It is also disconcerting that the Hendricks decision may open the
floodgates to prosecutors who will routinely use civil confinement to
augment and boost criminal sanctions. Justice Kennedy was mindful
of this probability. In his concurrence, he warned that if the civil system was being co-opted because of improvident criminal plea bar100. See id. at 2093-94 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
101. See Gould, TurningRat, supranote 28, at 839.

Tom Tyler's work in procedural justice also empirically illustrates that
persons involved in felony cases are more influenced by procedural fairness
rather than the leniency of the sentence they receive. See generally Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: Implications for

Civil Commitment Hearings,46 SMU L. REv. 433 (1992) (discussing the therapeutic effects of the commitment process).
102 See Daniel W. Shuman & Dr. Jean A. Hamilton, Jury Service-It May
Change Your Mind. Perceptionsof Fairnessof Jurorsand Nonjurors, 46 SMU L.
REv. 449, 451 (1992).
103. Id.
104. The basis for most inmate complaints turns on treatment issues. When
inmates feel that they are treated capriciously, psychological stress is created.
See James Bonta & Paul Gendreau, Reexamining the Cruel and Unusual Punishment of PrisonLife, 14 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 347, 361 (1990). Disturbingly,
one of the few studies of inmate perception of sentencing structures found that
20% of those interviewed, the majority of whom were serving time for serious
crimes, believed that switching to a system of determinate sentencing, where
there could be no time diminution for "good behavior" would "likely increase
[the] violence both in and outside of prison." Calvin J. Larson & Bruce L. Berg,
Inmates' Perceptions of Determinateand IndeterminateSentences, 7 BEHAv. SCI.
& L. 127, 132 (1989).
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05 Unethical
gains, then it was not performing its acceptable function."
prosecutors could also use the threat of civil commitment to coerce
criminal pleas'0 6 Defendants may choose to plead to longer sentences if coupled with an agreement that the prosecutor's office will
not seek to civilly commit the defendant as an SVP at the expiration
of his criminal sentence. Because of the potential abuses inherent in
sex offender statutes, at least one commentator found them
"explicitly intended to circumvent the traditional strict constitutional
limitations on the state's power to incarcerate." 1°7
In doing so, this also may allow prosecutors to be less concerned
with preserving evidentiary issues or to maintain a more relaxed investigatory posture in cases where the defendant may be eligible for
future SVP status. In any case it relieves the prosecutor from having
to consider any alternative sentencing options. As Justice Breyer
noted, incarceration and release or even incarceration, therapy, and
release, may not be the best way to modify sexual offender behavior.1" It may be that the best way to guard against recidivist behavior
is long-term monitoring, perhaps some type of long-term out-patient
commitment or probationary status.19
The last issue to discuss is perhaps the most perplexing. Defining rights of people with mental disabilities to engage in sexual activity "is one of the most threatening issues confronting clinicians, line
workers, administrators, advocates, and attorneys who are involved
in mental health care related work, as well as the families of indi-

105. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
106. Prosecutors are held to a high ethical standard. See Roland Acevado, Is a
Ban on PleaBargainingan EthicalAbuse of Discretion? A Bronx County, New
York Case Study, 64 FORDHAM L. Rnv. 987, 1004-05 (1995). They "have a duty
to seek justice [and] not merely to convict." Id. at 1005. This duty also includes
an oversight function where the prosecutor must remain mindful of his or her responsibilities to protect the community, quench the victim's desire for revenge,
safeguard the defendant's rights, and ensure that the criminal proceeding is fair
and efficient. See id.
107. Eric S. Janus, Sex Offender Commitments: Debunkingthe Official Narrative and Revealing the Rules-in-Use, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 71, 72-73 (1997)
("The rules the courts actually use to decide sex offender cases-'rules-in-use'reflect the real patterns of decisions which may be quite different from the espoused rules.").
108. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2094 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating "that the
statute, at least as of the time Kansas applied it to Hendricks, did not require the
committing authority to consider the possibility of less restrictive alternatives").
109. See Robert A. Prentky et al., Recidivism Rates Among Child Molesters
and Rapists:A MethodologicalAnalysis, 21 L. & HuM. BEHAV. 635 (1997).
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viduals with mental disabilities."'n Hendricks has sanctioned a more
lenient definition of mental disability that will permit people to be
civilly committed. This raises concerns regarding how these committments might impact people confined to civil and forensic wards
or hospitals, as well as people who are living in group homes or other
managed living situations.
People with mental disabilities have long been labelled with contradicting stereotypes and have been demonized with regard to their
sexuality. On the one hand, there is an assumption of infantilization.
This is a denial that people with mental disabilities, and especially
those who may be institutionalized, have the same sexual urges,
feelings, and needs as have the rest of us.m On the other hand, there
is a concomitant fear that the mentally disabled have primitive hypersexuality which may be fearfully unleashed in dangerous ways.'
The fact remains that, just like the non mentally disabled population, the vast majority of people with mental disabilities have socalled "normal sexual urges" and, if given the chance, they seek to
express those urges in socially appropriate ways. For instance,
among institutionalized psychiatric patients, two studies found that
the incidences of interpersonal relationships involving "physical behaviors" was about three to five percent on the acute care (shortterm) ward,' 3 but sexual interaction appears to be more common on
wards where the length of stay is longer than a few weeks."' It seems
reasonable to speculate that this is because patients are able to know

110. Michael L. Perlin, Hospitalized Patients and the Right to Sexual Interactiom Beyond the Last Frontier?,20 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 517, 520
(1993-94) [hereinafter Perlin, Last Frontier];see also Deborah W. Denno, Sexuality, Rape, and Mental Retardation,2 U. ILL. L. REv. 315 (1997) (regarding mentally retarded individuals who engage in sexual activity); Douglas Mossman et al.,
Sex on the Wards: Conundrafor Clinicians,25 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 441
(1997) (regarding institutionalized psychiatric patients).
111. See Perlin, Promises, supra note 23, at 969. This, of course, is just another
broad-reaching sanist attitude, where people without mental disabilities need to
separate "us" from "them," to distinguish, without empirical evidence, that
"[m]entally ill individuals are different and, perhaps, less than human." Perlin,
Last Frontier,supranote 110, at 536.
Professor Denno also explored how "throughout history society has
viewed mentally retarded persons as either asexual and childlike or hypersexual
and at risk of producing offspring 'as defective as themselves."' Denno, supra
note 110, at 315.
112. See Perlin, Promises,supra note 23, at 969.
113. Keimer et al., Co-patientRelationships on a Short-term Psychiatric Unit,
37 HosP. COMMuNrrY PSYCHIATRY 166 (1986).
114. See Keimer, supranote 113, at 166.
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each other better and become more comfortable with each other on
the longer-term units.1" Although responding to an inpatient's expressions of sexuality "is a common issue in clinical practice," tolerance of sexual expression often depends on which staff member is on
duty."6 The question remains whether the response of a staff member, who is seeking to prohibit sexual expression, can serve as a
predicate to transfer a civil committee to the specialized sexual offender unit.
First let us examine what, if any, rights to sexual freedom are
granted to persons involuntarily committed to a psychiatric setting.
In 1972 Federal District Court Judge Frank Johnson in Wyatt v.
Stickney17 articulated a broad range of civil rights to which all civilly
committed persons were entitled."' These rights were adopted in
most states as a standard "Patient's Bill of Rights."1 9 The portion of
the Wyatt standards that guaranteed patients the right to "suitable
opportunities for.., interaction with members of the opposite sex""'
was only adopted by four states." But, with the numerous Supreme
Court cases establishing individual rights to procreation," reproductive decisions," contraception," and marriage" the scope of privacy
rights in this area has been greatly enlarged. Yet, the recognition of
these privacy rights has not translated into state recognition of a patient's right to personal or interpersonal sexual relationships. 6 Clinicians have begun to recognize that sexual freedom can have therapeutic value and should be considered in designing appropriate ward
115. See Mossman, supra note 110, at 443.
116. Id. "These findings suggest that mental health professionals, like most
citizens, judge inpatient's [sic] behavior based on conventional social norms and
prejudices rather than by legal standards. One study correlated a lower tolerance
for inpatient sexual behavior with staff members who are older, less educated,
and more religiously observant." Id. (citation omitted).
However, the "actual reporting on and decision making about inpatient
sexual behavior often depends on the tastes and whims of ward staff and is influenced by a variety of emotional, moral and practical issues that have not been
discussed in professional publications." Id. at 444.
117. 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
118. See id.
119. See id
120. Id. at 381.
121. There has also been no follow-up litigation establishing that this phrase
confers a right to sexual interaction. See Mossman, supranote 110, at 454.
122. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
123. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 1133 (1973).
124. See Griswold v. Connecticut; 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
125. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
126. Perlin, Last Frontier,supra note 110, at 531.
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standards."z This indicates that institutions have an obligation to discuss these matters and work with the patients in establishing appropriate parameters to sexual activity. One such possibility is the incorporation of model policies concerning consensual sexual
relations.'"
In the midst of a cautiously more liberalized view of sexuality in
persons with mental disabilities, the Supreme Court decided Kansas
v. Hendricks. What, if any, impact might this decision have on the
way treatment centers view sexual expression among persons with
mental disabilities? The first issue is whether patients who may be
considered "difficult" by some staff members or "disliked" by others
because they assert themselves in an inappropriate manner, are at
risk of being transferred to one of the repressive, specialized sexual
offender units? All of the SVP statutes demand that there be a prior
sexual criminal conviction or charge before an individual can be
given SVP status. How much of a charge must be filed? Must it be a
criminal charge, or is an incident report filed at a hospital sufficient?
Most states have an administrative regulation which allows the
Commissioner of Mental Health-or whatever the title is in any
given state-to administratively transfer a patient from a less secure
to a more secure institution if the patient poses a safety threat. Will
the State Department of Mental Health allow certain patients to be
administratively transferred to specialized SVP units as they now allow for the administrative transfer between forensic and civil wards
or facilities? 29' What due process rights will such patients have to reject such an administrative transfer?
The more difficult situation facing a committee in this context is
the person who repeatedly masturbates in the day room, to the displeasure of the staffYm Will the institution be able to ship this patient
to the SVP institution because he or she has become a bother to the
civil hospital's staff? The Kansas Act provides that SVPs may not be
housed with the "regular" civil patients, but this portion of the statute
127. See Susan Stefan, Whose Egg Is It Anyway?: Reproductive Rights of In-

carcerated,Institutionalizedand Incompetent Women, 13 NOvA L. REv. 405, 455

(1989).

128. For an example of a model policy concerning consensual sexual relations

among long-term psychiatric inpatients, see Mossman, supra note 110, at 455.
129. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYGiENE LAW § 29.11(a) (McKinney 1997)
("Subject to his regulations, the commissioner may order or approve the transfer

of a patient from one facility to another appropriate facility.").

130. The staff has the power to control all aspects of a patient's life, even in
terms of telephone privileges, access to lawyers, cigarettes, etc.
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has yet to be tested.
The Act only mandates that someone is eligible if they have
been charged with a sexual offense.3' Would an institutional incident
report serve as a proper "charge?" What if there was an inconclusive
investigation following the incident report? Will the sexual predator
institution become a dumping ground for the hard-to-handle mentally ill? Or, will this statute become a means for hospitals to avoid
having to deal with the sexual rights or needs of their patients.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Both the majority opinion and the dissent argued heatedly as to
whether the system of likely life-long incapacitation envisioned by
the Kansas Violent Predator Statute is punishment, some other constitutionally acceptable alternative basis for civil commitment,"' or
something else-other than treatment, although there may be some
incidental treatment. 33 The Hendricks case muddles the lines between criminal and civil grounds for detention and provokes concerns
for persons outside the initial purview of the sexual predator label.
The new civil commitment construct encourages our society to become far too acculturated to revenge by enlarging the boundaries of
criminal justice procedures spill over into the civil arena.

131. See KAN. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59-29a04 (West 1994 & Supp. 1996).

132. See Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2097 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

133. This seems to oppose prior Supreme Court "right to treatment" cases that

held that treatment may not be promised as a basis for civil commitment and
then not provided, and beneficial treatment may not be withheld if it will help
minimize the length of confinement or create other fundamental constitutional
deprivations. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 564 (1975); see also Parry,supra note 54, at 436.

